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Article 7

Tax Deductions for Payments to Mormon
Missionaries
This article addresses the issue of whether payments made by parents to support their child who is serving a Mormon mission should be
deductible as charitable contributions under section 170 of the Internal
Revenue Code. Three circuits of the United States Court of Appeals
have considered this issue and have reached three different results. Two
of the circuits allowed the deduction/ but for different reasons, and the
third denied the deduction. 2 This paper analyzes and evaluates the different approaches taken by the three circuits and concludes that the
payments should be deductible by the parents.

I.

A.

INTRODUCTION

Factual Setting

The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormon
Church) operates a "worldwide missionary program with more than
25,000 unsalaried missionaries proselytizing and performing other religious services in foreign countries and in the United States." 3 In order
to qualify for missionary service, candidates must demonstrate to a
church authority that they are in compliance with strict Mormon standards regarding moral worthiness, and that they are spiritually, physically, and emotionally fit for missionary service. 4 During the mission,
missionaries engage in no other occupation and devote their entire efforts to the work of the church: "Mission rules prohibit missionaries
from dating, attending movies or plays, or engaging in various sports or
other activities. Missionaries are required to submit weekly reports to
their Mission President detailing the amount of time spent in church
service and explaining their expenses for the week." 5 "The church exercises almost total control over the missionary, who serves as an ordained minister of the church." 6
Although missionaries are encouraged to finance their missions by
1. White v. United States, 725 F.2d 1269 (10th Cir. 1984); Brinley v. Commissioner, 782
F.2d 1326 (5th Cir. 1986).
2. Davis v. Commissioner, 861 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1988).
3. Brinley at 1328.
4. !d.

5. Davis at 559.
6. White at 1270.
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saving sufficient funds beforehand, it is common for parents to provide
most of the financial support for their missionary child. The policy of
the church is to ask the missionary's parents to make monthly payments directly to their child. "The church sets the monthly payments in
an amount it deems necessary to pay the child's minimum living expenses"7 according to the area of the world in which the child is assigned to serve. The church does not discourage the parents from making additional payments to their child "but regards such payments as
personal gifts to the missionary." 8 The amount of the monthly payments, as set by the church, has not been an issue and, therefore, is
presumed to be within the bounds of reasonableness. Most of the payment is used for transportation, meals, and lodging by the missionary.
The church states a number of reasons for its policy of requesting
the missionary's family to pay the expenses of the mission as opposed to
subsidizing it out of the general funds of the church. First, the church
feels that direct contributions to missionaries foster the church doctrine
of sacrifice and consecration. Second, the church believes that direct
transmittal promotes frugality by missionaries because of their awareness of the personal sacrifices that are being made on their behalf.
Third, direct transmittal of contributions reduces the administrative
and bookkeeping expenses that would otherwise be imposed on the
church. 9

B.

Applicable Law

Section 170(a) of the Internal Revenue Code allows, as a deduction, any charitable contribution made within the taxable year. 10 Paragraph (c) of that section defines a charitable contribution as a contribution or gift "to or for the use of" a corporation organized and operated
exclusively for religious purposes. The Federal Tax Regulations provide an additional way to qualify for a charitable deduction in section
1.170A-1:
(g) Contributions of services. No deduction is allowable under
section 170 for a contribution of services. However, UNREIMBURSED
EXPENDITURES MADE INCIDENT TO THE RENDITION OF SERVICES TO

contributions to which are deductible MAY CONFor example, the cost of a
uniform without general utility which is required to be worn in performing donated services is deductible. Similarly, out-of-pocket transAN ORGANIZATION

STITUTE A DEDUCTIBLE CONTRIBUTION.

7. /d.
8. /d.
9. Davis at 559-60.
I 0. l.R.C. § 170(a) (1982).
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portation expenses necessarily incurred in performing donated services
are deductible. REASONABLE EXPENDITURES FOR MEALS AND LODGING NECESSARILY INCURRED WHILE AWAY FROM HOME IN THE
COURSE OF PERFORMING DONATED SERVICES ALSO ARE DEDUCTIBLE.

For the purposes of this paragraph, the phrase "while away from
home" has the same meaning as that phrase is used for purposes of
section 162 and the regulations thereunder. 11

The Mormon Church qualifies as a charitable organization as described in section 170. 12 Therefore, the deductibility of the payments in
question depends upon the determination that they are either "to or for
the use of" the Mormon Church or that they are proper out-of-pocket
expenses incurred in the rendition of services to the Mormon Church.
The IRS's resistance to allowing these deductions is based on the
following facts: ( 1) the services being rendered were performed by
someone other than the taxpayer claiming the deduction; (2) it is unclear whether the missionary was "away from home" for tax purposes
in order to qualify for the meals and lodging deduction of section
1.170A-1(g); and (3) the payments were earmarked for, or paid directly
to, the parent's missionary child which means the church did not have
discretionary control over the funds.
This article focuses on these three factors and concludes the
following:
1. Although the parents should be entitled to claim the deduction
as incidental out-of-pocket expenses even though they did not actually
perform the services, the away-from-home limitation severely restricts
the amount of the deduction;
2. Because of the strict control exercised by the church over the
missionary, the payments should qualify as "to or for the use of" the
church.

II.
A.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

White v. United States

The first instance of this issue appearing in the courts was White
v. United States, 13 in which the taxpayers claimed they were entitled to
a charitable contribution for payments made to their missionary son.
The government's motion for summary judgement was granted because
the White's son was not a qualifying charitable organization, and be11. Treas. Reg. Section 1.170A-1 (emphasis added).
12. Internal Revenue Service Publication No. 78, Cumulative List of Organizations 216
(1984).
13. 514 F. Supp. 1057 (D. Utah 1981).
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cause the Mormon Church did not have discretion over the use of the
funds. 14
On appeal, however, the district court's decision was reversed, and
the White's were permitted the deduction. The appellate court allowed
the deduction, not as payments to or for the use of the church according
to I.R.C. section 170, but as out-of-pocket expenses incurred in rendering services to a church according to Treasury Regulation section
1.170-1 (g). 111 In allowing the deduction, the court relied on a "primary
benefit" test which held that the deduction was allowed if the primary
purpose of the expenditure was to benefit the church rather than the
taxpayer. 16 The Tenth Circuit concluded that the church, not the parents, was primarily served and emphasized the following facts: (a) the
Whites were responding to the Church's request that they sponsor their
missionary son; (b) the church set the monthly payment amount
deemed to be the amount necessary to pay the child's minimum living
expenses; and (c) the church exercised almost total control over the missionary and his activities. 17
B.

Brinley v. Commissioner

In 1983, the Tax Court rejected the Brinley's claimed payments to
their Mormon missionary son on their 1977 tax return because the son,
not the church, had full control over the funds. 18 After the Tenth Circuit's decision in White, the Tax Court reheard the case but reached
the same result as their first decision. 19
This decision, however, was vacated after appeal to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. 20 In general, the Brinley court agreed with the
White court's adoption of the primary benefit test according to section
1.170A-1 (g) and relied upon the following factors: ( 1) the nature of
out-of-pocket expenses does not contemplate the exercise of control over
the funds by charity; 21 (2) nothing in section 1.170A-1 (g) expressly
limits the deduction for expenditures incurred in the rendition of ser14. /d. at 1059.
15. White at 1270-71.
16. /d. at 1271-72.
17. /d. at 1270.
18. Brinley v. Commissioner, 46 T.C.M. (CCH) 734 (1983).
19. Brinley v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 932 (1984). The court rejected the Tenth Circuit's
reliance upon § 1.170A-1 (g) because for payments to a third party rendering services to a charity,
as opposed to expenses incurred by the taxpayer himself, the charity must have control over the
funds. Since the Brinleys had sent the money directly to their son, the church did not exercise the
requisite control.
20. Brinley v. Commissioner, 782 F.2d 1326 (5th Cir. 1986).
21. /d. at 1332.
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vices to the person who actually performs the services; 22 and (3) the
Fifth Circuit standard for determining the deductibility of charitable
out-of-pocket expenses is causation 23 which the court equated to the
primary benefit test. 24 The court concluded that if the taxpayers could
show that their payments primarily benefit the church, they would be
deductible.
Favorable as this analysis may seem, the Brinley court went on to
severely restrict the potential deduction under a primary benefit test
through the application of the "away from home" limitation. Relying
upon an analysis of the "away from home" phrase contained in a prior
Fifth Circuit opinion, 25 the court concluded that the missionary's tax
home was his area of mission service; therefore, he was not "away from
home" and meals and lodging would not be deductible. 26 Since food
and lodging account for most of the missionary's expenses, the limited
allowance of the primary benefit test does not help the missionary's
parents.
Fortunately for the Brinleys, however, the court did not restrict
the allowance of the deduction to the primary benefit test and section
1.170A-1 (g). They also fashioned a control test for I.R.C. section 170
and held that if either the primary benefit test or the control test is met,
the deduction is allowed. 27 The control test did not require that the
church have physical control over the funds; rather, it was sufficient to
show that the church had requested that the parents/taxpayers make
specific payments, and that the parents had responded to these requests.28 Therefore, the court allowed the deduction based on the "to or
for the use of' language of I.R.C. section 170 as well as the out-ofpocket expenses language of section 1.170A.1 (g).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1331 (citing Orr v. United States, 343 F. 2d 553, 557 (5th Cir. 1965)).
24. Brinley at 1331.
25. Michel v. Commissioner, 629 F.2d 1071, 1073 (5th Cir. 1980), states the rule: "A taxpayer who accepts permanent or indefinite employment in a location different from that of his
residence, however, is considered to have moved his tax home to the new location, and is therefore
no longer considered away from home. A job may be considered indefinite or permanent if, under
all the circumstances, it appears likely to last beyond a shore period of time.
As is discussed later, the IRS presumes that if an assignment will last more than a year, it is
permanent or indefinite and a deduction is not allowed.
26. Brinley at 1333-34.
27. Id. at 1336.
28. Id. at 1334-35. The matching of the solicitation by the charity and the subsequent payment by the solicitor was held as distinguishing the missionary situation from the situations in
which payments to charities were made for the benefit of individuals attending church sponsored
schools. See Tripp v. Commissioner, 337 F.2d 432 (7th Cir. 1964), and Thomason v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 441 (1943).
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Davis v. United States

After the Tenth Circuit's decision in White, the Davis' filed
amended tax returns for 1980 and 1981 in order to claim payments to
their missionary children during those years. When the IRS refused to
issue a refund, the Davis' sued the Commissioner in Idaho's District
Court. 29 The Idaho court granted the government's motion for summary judgement and rejected both White's primary benefit test and
Brinley's liberal control test. The Idaho district court rejected the primary benefit test because incidental expenses must be incurred by the
person rendering the services. They rejected the liberal control test because the church did not have physical control of the funds. 30
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision and held
the payments non-deductible. 31 The court held that the charity must
have full control over the donated funds because "the beneficiary of a
charitable contribution must be indefinite." 82 The court agreed with the
lower court that abuse might result from allowing the taxpayers to deduct expenses incurred by a third person rendering services to a charity.88 Further, the court found legislative committee comments and explanations that support the position that only taxpayers who actually
perform the services are entitled to a deduction. 84

Ill.

DISCUSSION

A. Can the parents deduct the payments as out of pocket expenses
according to Treasury Regulations § 1.170A-l(g)?
1.

The primary benefit test

Each of the three major cases recognize the primary benefit test as
the proper standard for determining deductibility of out-of-pocket charitable expenses. 36 The courts, however, disagree as to its application to
the Mormon missionary situation. Therefore, a brief discussion of the
cases which are frequently cited by the courts should provide a helpful
background.
In Sampson v. Commissioner, 36 the taxpayer became actively involved in a war against drugs after two of the taxpayer's four children
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Davis v. United States, 664 F. Supp. 468 (D. Idaho 1987).
ld. at 472.
Davis v. United States, 861 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1988).
ld. at 562 (citing Russell v. Allen, 107 U.S. 163, 167 (1883)).
ld. at 563.
Id. at 564.
White at 1271; Brinley at 1331; Davis at 562.
43 T.C.M. (CCH) 1408 (1982), cited in White at 1271; and Brinley at 1332-33.
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had destroyed their lives using hard drugs. He worked in close cooperation with law-enforcement officials, expending his own money to
purchase information on drug-dealing and to fund "buys" of heroin
through undercover agents. The taxpayer claimed the amounts expended as a charitable contribution to the state of Kansas and his local
county. The IRS denied his deduction, claiming (1) the funds were not
expended exclusively for public purposes because they were used for
the taxpayer's "private" war on drugs, and (2) the government had no
control over the amounts spent. The Tax Court allowed the deduction
because the taxpayer was subject to the control and supervision of the
attorney general, and because the services he rendered primarily benefited the state and community. 37
The Sampson decision supports the missionary's parent's position.
The court rejects the same arguments that the government makes in the
missionary cases. Namely, that the payments were used for a personal,
non-deductible purpose and that the church did not have control over
the funds.
In Babilonia v. Commissioner, 38 the parents of an Olympic figure
skater deducted payments for skating lessons and the cost of accompanying their daughter to various international competitions as contributions to the United States Olympic Team. The Ninth Circuit denied
the deduction because the taxpayers were more likely motivated by concern for their daughter and an interest in her career than by an interest
in the Olympic Team. 39 Applied to the missionary cases, this decision
appears to favor the government's position. In both instances, parents
are supporting their children who are performing services for a charitable organization.
Even though the Babilonia decision denies the parent's deduction,
the Tax Court's analysis of the primary benefit test in Babilonia v.
Commissioner, 40 supports the deduction by the missionary's parents.
The court stated:
Expenses which are incurred incident to the rendition of services
to a charitable organization often have a dual character in that they
benefit both the charity and the taxpayer. IN SUCH CASES THE PRESENCE OF A SUBSTANTIAL, DIRECT, PERSONAL BENEFIT TO THE TAXPAYER OR SOMEONE OTHER THAN THE CHARITY IS FATAL TO THE

37. /d. at 1413.
38. 681 F.2d 678 (9th Cir. 1982) cited in White at 1271; and Davis at 471.
39. Babilonia at 679.
40. 40 T.C.M (C.C.H.) 485 (1980). The Ninth Circuit's short opinion merely stated the
rule and held that the Tax Court's factual determination that the expenses primarily benefited the
taxpayer was not clearly erroneous, Therefore, the facts and analysis of this case are found in the
Tax Court's opinion.
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41

The Tax Court denied the deduction because they held that the benefits which accrued to the olympic team were incidental to the anticipated personal benefits of "recognition, fame, personal satisfaction, and
a future career in professional skating. " 42 Mormon missionaries, however, do not expect a substantial, direct, personal benefit from their two
year service. Therefore, since there is no conflict of direct, personal,
financial benefit, which acts to deny the deduction in Babilonia, the
application of the primary benefit test in the Mormon missionary situation should favor the taxpayer.
Sheffels v. United States 43 involves two different taxpayers, a
farmer and a doctor. They traveled to the Orient on a tour set up by an
organization which promoted travel of American citizens in foreign
countries to meet and exchange ideas with the local residents. The taxpayers each claimed a donation to the United States government for his
or her expenses of the trip. Both claims were denied. The court dismissed the farmer's claim since he and his wife spent a substantial
amount of time in regular tourist activities. 44 The court's decision was
not as easy for the doctor. Her itinerary included numerous visits to
hospitals, nursing homes, and schools discussing preparation of meals
and sanitation. Her tour "left little time for shopping or individual
sightseeing." 45 Nevertheless, the court felt the primary beneficiary was
the taxpayer and the government was served only incidentally. 46
The Sheffels decision may be distinguished from the Mormon missionary situation based on the primary benefit test. The court may have
reasonably assumed the experience benefitted her professional career,
or that she was more interested in visiting the Orient and interacting
with its medical professionals than she was in serving the United States
by improving U.S. relations with those countries. The missionaries, on
the other hand, indicate their desire to serve the church and are assigned wherever the church determines they are most needed. They labor for two years under the control and supervision of the church,
solely for its benefit.
In summary, the primary benefit test allows a deduction for
amounts spent incident to the performance of church missionary work
because there is no expectation of a direct, economic benefit accruing to
/d. at 488 (emphasis added.)
/d.

41.
42.
43.
44.

264 F.Supp. 85 (E.D. Wash. 1967) cited in White 1271; and Davis at 471.
Sheffels at 88.

45.

/d.

46. /d.
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the missionary, and because the primary beneficiary of the proselyting
services is the church. This is consistent with decisions of cases involving missionaries of other churches. 47 The peculiar issue in the Mormon
missionary case is the taxpayer claiming the deduction is not the missionary performing the services.

2. Requirement that expenses incurred by persons performing services may only be deductible by that person
The White court present two arguments, one statutory and one
judicial, for the allowance of the deduction even though the taxpayers'
children perform the missionary service. The statutory argument is
based upon I.R.C. section 262 which disallows deductions for personal,
living, or family expenses.u Treasury Regulation section 1.262-1 (b)(S)
specifically excludes expenses deductible under section 1.170A-1 (g)
from the nondeductibility rule of section 262. White's reasoning is that
section 1.262-1 (b)(S) creates a presumption that section 1.170A-1 (g)
refers to out of pocket payments for "personal, living, or family expenses" incurred in the rendition of charitable service. Therefore, personal and family expenses must be treated the same so that if personal
expenses are deductible, family expenses must also be deductible!'
This argument is flawed. section 262-1 (b)(S) merely recognizes an existing exception to section 262; it does not attempt to further define the
exception.
The judicial argument presented in White, however, is persuasive;
it cites precedents to show that expenses incident to charitable services
performed by another individual may still be claimed by the taxpayer
who paid for them. In Rockefeller v. Commissioner, 110 the Second Circuit addressed large deductions for charitable contributions claimed by
members of the well-known Rockefeller dynasty. The taxpayers shared
the expenses of operating an organization, with a staff of over 200 employees, which was set up to provide family members with legal, accounting, clerical, and investment services. The staff also provided services to charitable organizations. The Rockefellers deducted, as
charitable contributions, the percentage of salaries and wages paid to
their staff members that were attributable to the charitable services
provided to qualified organizations.
The White court points out that the IRS did not contest the de47. Smith v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 988 (1973); Davenport v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M.
(C.C.H.) 1585 (1975).
48. White at 1271.
49. ld.
50. 676 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1982).
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ductibility of payments made by David Rockefeller to his employees
who provided services to charitable organizations. 111 In that instance,
someone other than the performer of the services paid the expenses and
was allowed the deduction without any application of the control test
and without any resistance from the IRS. Similarly, in Archbold v.
United States, 112 a taxpayer claimed a charitable contribution for payments to a private law firm to oppose the construction of a highway
through land which the taxpayer had previously donated to the United
States. The court held that the payments were deductible even though
the services were rendered by someone other than the payer and the
charity never had control of the funds.
The Davis court, on the other hand, considers the White analysis
but flatly rejects it for three reasons. First, the court is sympathetic to
the increased burden imposed upon the IRS to verify the expense. 13
Second, the court cites an observation of the House Ways and Means
Committee concerning section 1.170A-1 (g). 114 Third, the court distinguishes the Rockefeller case relied on by White from the Mormon missionary situation. 1111
The Davis argument is neither conclusive, nor more persuasive
than the White I Brinley position. At best, it is as persuasive as the other
courts' decisions. Considering the burden to the IRS, the Brinley court
points out that a "rigorous application of a primary benefit analysis
precludes serious possibility of abuse" since the burden lies with the
taxpayer to establish the deduction primarily benefitted the church. 118
The burden would not be on the IRS to disprove the deduction, rather
on the taxpayer to establish how the funds were used and why they
should be deductible.
The language of the Congressional committee reports is distinguishable for two reasons. First, it is not law and, therefore, should be
referred to only to establish the, intent of the legislature. Even though
51. White at 1271.
52. 444 F.2d 1120 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
53. Davis at 563-64. The Davis court points out two types of potential abuse of the deduction: inflated deduction's claimed by the parents, and double deductions claimed by both the parents and the child.
54. Id. at 564. "A taxpayer may deduct, a charitable deductions, unreimbursed out-of-pocket
expenses incurred incident to the rendition of services provided by the taxpayer to a charitable
organization."(Citing H.R. Rep. No. 99-426, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 119 (1985) (emphasis added
by court)).
The court also cites the Joint Committee on Taxation's General Explanation of the Revenue
Provisions of the Deficit Reduction act of 1984, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. at 1133 which states: "Onreimbursed out-of-pocket expenses incurred by the taxpayer in rendering services to an' organization are eligible for deduction as charitable contributions." (emphasis added by court.)
55. ld. at 564-65.
56. Brinley at 1332.
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the language appears to limit the deduction, it is not clear that the
intent was to limit the deduction. A strict construction may be appropriate for a statute, but not for a committee report. Second, adopting
such a strict reading of those reports would mean that the Rockefeller
decision was incorrect, because Rockefeller was not the taxpayer rendering the services.
The Davis court distinguishes the Rockefeller case from the Mormon missionary case because "the missionary sons were acting independently of their parents and the parents were not rendering their service
to the church." 67 This statement is accurate but fails to consider that
the church controls the activities of the missionaries. Therefore, in
Rockefeller, the taxpayer pays persons under his control to provide services to a charity while in Davis the taxpayer pays persons under the
charity's control. There is a distinction, but it does not appear sufficient
to allow a deduction to one taxpayer and not the other.

3.

The "away from home" limitation

The White decision does not address the "away from home" limitation, but it does cite Smith v. Commissioner68 as holding that living
expenses of a missionary serving far from home are deductible because
the expenditures primarily benefit the church. 69 In Smith, the taxpayer /missionary spent one month during each of the two years in
question proselyting in Newfoundland trying to convert local people to
his faith. The Tax Court allowed his expenses as a charitable contribution and specifically allowed his meals because he was away from
home. The holding does not apply entirely to the Mormon missionaries, however, because Smith's mission only lasted one month, which
precludes it from the application of one year rule as shown below.
Treasury Regulation section 1.170A-1 (g), which allows expenditure incident to the performance of services, specifically states that "the
phrase while 'away from home' has the same meaning as the phrase as
used for purposes of section 162 and the regulations thereunder." As
Brinley points out, the question of whether a taxpayer is "away from
home" is a question of fact to be determined from the circumstances of
each case. 60 There are, however, some established guidelines to determine the taxpayer's tax home. In a normal situation, a taxpayer lives
and works in the same vicinity, which is considered her tax home. If
the taxpayer is required to work outside this vicinity on a temporary
57.
58.
59.
60.

Davis at 565.
60 T.C. 988 (1973).

White at 1271.
Davis at 1333.
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basis, she is considered away from home, and the expenses for meals
and lodging during that time are deductible. If, however, the taxpayer
works outside the vicinity of her residence on a permanent or indefinite
basis, the expenses are not deductible because her tax home becomes
her place of employment, not her residence. Although the distinction
between temporary and permanent or indefinite is a question of fact,
any assignment expected to last more than one year is presumed by the
IRS to be permanent or indefinite. Although this one year presumption
is an IRS administrative decision, it has generally been followed by the
courts. For example, Ford v. Commissioner, 61 involved a construction
worker who was assigned to work in a different city on a project which
was expected to last twelve to fourteen months. The Fourth Circuit
upheld the IRS determination that since the assignment was expected
to last longer than a year, the taxpayer was not away from home for
tax purposes.
This one year rule of thumb would seem to preclude the bulk of
the payments made to Mormon missionaries. Missionaries serve for either eighteen months or two years in a specific geographic location.
Although they may be moved around within that geographic boundary,
they remain in the same general area.
There are some exceptions to the one year rule, however, which
are outlined in Revenue Ruling 83-82. Essentially, if the taxpayer can
show (1) that the employment will not last more than two years, and
(2) that the claimed tax home is the regular place of abode in a real
and substantive sense, he may be considered away from home. Assuming it is unnecessary to quibble about whether the stay is a few days
over or under two years, the first requirement is met. Missions do not
extend more than two years. In order for a taxpayer to meet the second
requirement, the Revenue Ruling identifies three objective factors that
may be required to be met:
(1) Whether the taxpayer has used the claimed abode while performing work in the vicinity thereof immediately prior to the current
job and the taxpayer continues to maintain bona fide work contacts in
that area during the alleged temporary employment;
(2) Whether the taxpayer's living expenses at the claimed abode
are duplicated because work requires the taxpayer to be away from the
abode; and
(3) Whether the taxpayer, a) has a family member or members
(marital or lineal only) currently residing at the claimed abode, or b)
continues to currently use the claimed abode frequently for the pur61. 227 F.2d 297 (4th Cir. 1955).
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poses of the taxpayer's lodging. 62
These factors do not apply to a young missionary. It is unlikely
that he or she has ever had bona fide work contacts, let alone maintains
them. The living expenses are duplicated because the parents provide
meals and lodging at their home and also for their missionary child, but
they are not duplicated by the person away from home. Since missionaries are not married, they do not have marital or lineal family members
currently residing at the claimed abode. Based upon the application of
the § 162 "away from home" rules, the amount of the parents' payments which represent out-of pocket expenses for meals and lodging of
the missionary should not be allowed.

4.

Summary of the section 1.170A-l(g) analysis

Theoretically, the parents should be entitled to deduct the payments to their missionary children even though the child performed the
charitable services: The Mormon church is primarily benefited by the
child's services, neither the parents nor the child receive any financial
or tangible benefit from the payments (other than that normally associated with charitable contributions), and existing case law allows deductions for taxpayers who have made payments to third parties who perform services for a charity. However, since section 1.170A-1 (g) clearly
invokes the well established "away from home" rule to incidental payments, the application of that rule, as a practical matter, would severely restrict the amount that could be deducted. The parents would
likely be better off ignoring the deduction in favor of claiming the child
as a dependent. Therefore, in order to obtain the deduction, the parents
must rely upon the "to or for the use of" language of I.R.C. section
170(c).

B. Can the parents deduct the payments as "to or for the use of' the
church according to Internal Revenue Code section 170(c)?
1.

The primary benefit test

Unlike the later cases, which separated the analysis of the section
170A-1 (g) "incidental expenses" deduction from the section 170(c) "to
or for the use of" deduction, the White court treated section 170A-1 (g)
as a way to satisfy the "for the use of" clause of I.R.C. section 170(c). 63
The court relied exclusively upon the primary benefit test and specifically rejected the requirement that the church have control of the ex62. Rev. Rul. 83-82, 1983-1 C.B. 45.
63. White, at 1270, states that the court agreed with the White's that the payments were "to
the use of the church and relied solely on Treas. Reg. I. {70A-1 (g)."
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penditure of the donated funds. 64 As support, it cited Rockefeller in
which it was clear that the charities benefited by the service of Mr.
Rockefeller's staff never had any control over the payments, and
Archbold in which the United States government never exercised control over the funds paid to the taxpayer's attorneys to protect
Archbold's donation of land. 611

2.

The control test

Both the Brinley and Davis courts, however, formulated control
tests in order to determine the deductibility of the payments. In fashioning a liberal control test, the Brinley court relied heavily upon a
prior Fifth Circuit holding, Winn v. Commissioner, 66 in which a taxpayer paid $10,000 to a church fund established for a missionary (not a
Mormon missionary) working in Korea. The missionary was the taxpayer's cousin and the check was channeled directly into the missionary's personal account by her father who was an elder in the church.
The $10,000 was held to be deductible. The Brinley court cited Winn
for the propositions that a donor may earmark a contribution for a
specific charitable purpose without losing the deduction. Also, if the
donation was solicited by the charity, the contribution would still be
considered "for the use of' that particular charity even though the donor controlled which of the charity's activities would receive the benefit
of the gift. 67 Applying the Winn analysis, the court held that if "the
Brinleys can show that the church requested them to make specific payments and that they responded to those specific requests," the deduction
would be allowed. 68
The Davis court, on the other hand, required a more stringent
control test, holding that it was necessary for the recipient charity to
have full control over the donated funds. The Davis control test required not only physical control by the charity, but also discretional
control so the church, not the taxpayer, decided how the funds would
be spent. Applying this test, the Davis court denied the deduction to the
parents because the funds were solely within the control of the
missionaries. 69
As support for its strict control test, the Davis court cited an 1883
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

/d. at 1271.

/d.
595 F.2d 1060 (5th Cir. 1979).
Brinley at 1330.
/d. at 1335.
Davis at 565.
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case, Russell v. Allen, 70 in which a grantor set up a trust which would
pay money to a charitable institution whose purpose was to provide
money for the education of youth in St. Louis County, Missouri. The
heirs of the grantor challenged the trust because the institution had not
been established or incorporated before the grantor died. In describing
what constituted a charitable trust, the Supreme Court used the following language: "They may, and indeed must, be for the benefit of an
indefinite number of persons; for if all the beneficiaries are personally
designated, the trust lacks the essential element of indefiniteness, which
is one characteristic of a legal charity." 71
Other cases with similar holdings which are frequently cited by
courts considering the Mormon missionary issue are Winn v Commissioner (discussed above); 72 Tripp v. Commissioner73 (payments to a college scholarship fund that were earmarked for a particular individual
were not deductible); 74 Thomason v. Commissioner 75 (denied a deduction for a donation to a qualified welfare agency to pay for the schooling of a specific individual); 76 and Peace v. Commissioner, 77 (allowed
deduction for funds donated to a church mission society with the stipulation that specific amounts should go to each of four designated
missionaries). 78

3.

Primary benefit v. con. rol test

In the Mormon missionary context, the primary benefit test is
more appropriately applied than the control test for two reasons. First,
the "for the use of" 1<• ·1guage of I.R.C. section 170 implies that the
charity will not contJ ol •.he payment; and second, the cases cited as support for the control test are distinguishable from the missionary case
because of a primary benefit analysis.
Requiring the charity to have physical and discretional control
over donated funds in all circumstances would be equivalent to eliminating the "for the use of" phrase of section 170. The phrase implies
that the organization will not have control over, but instead will receive
the benefits of, the payments. Commenting on the phrase "for the use
of," the Thomason court said:
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

107 U.S. 165 (1883).
/d. at 167.
Cited in Davis at 561, Brinley at 1330; and White at 1272.
337 F.2d 432 (7th Cir. 1964).
Cited in White at 1271; Brinley at 1332 and Davis at 561.
2 TC. 441 (1943).
Cited in Brinley at 1332; White at 1271.
43 TC. 1 (1964).
Cited in Davis at 561; Brinley at 1335.
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The phrase certainly implies that the contribution need not be made
directly to the charitable institution . . . . Doubtless, if an exempt
organization incurs liabilities in the general performance of its functions and requests its donors to pay its contributions to its creditors,
the payments will be for the use of the charity. 79

The parents of Mormon missionaries claim that their payments are for
the use of the church and, therefore, the church need not control the
funds because it is primarily benefited by the payments.
The government, and the Davis court, respond with the cases referred to above as holding that because the payments are earmarked for
someone other than the church, the control test applies. However, the
key distinction between the Russell, Tripp, and Thomason cases and
the Mormon missionary situation hinges on a primary benefit analysis.80 In those cases, the donated funds were used to pay for the schooling of designated individuals. Even though the students were attending
a church sponsored school (Tripp), or the government was spared from
possibly having to disburse funds for the education of the individuals
(Russell and Thomason), the primary beneficiary was the individual
being educated. The Mormon missionaries, on the other hand, were not
being primarily benefited. They were being supported so they could
serve the church without any expectation of benefit accruing to them.
A better rule to reconcile the holdings is as follows: The initial
question is who is primarily benefitted. If the charity is primarily and
exclusively benefited, then the deduction should be allowed. If someone
other than the charity is primarily benefitted, or even substantially
benefitted, then closer scrutiny is required to ensure that the donation is
th~ result of a genuine "detached and disinterested generosity." 81 The
control test may well be determinative in those situations but other factors may be considered depending on the situation.

4.

Summary of the section 170 analysis

The Mormon church primarily benefited from the payments made
by parents to their missionary children because the missionaries served
full time for the church, their actions were controlled by the church,
and the missionaries received no identifiable benefit from their service.
This satisfies the detached and disinterested generosity requirement of
Commissioner v. Duberstein and distinguishes the Mormon missionary
79. Thomason at 444.
80. This is not true for Peace. Although the result in Peace favors the missionary's claim, the
analysis does not. But this analysis is consistent with the Tax Court's repeated rejection of the
missionary's parent's dedu~tions which has been overruled by two circuits.
81. Commissioner v Duberstein, 373 U.S. 278, 285 (1960).
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situation from the cases cited by the opponents of the deduction. In
those cases, it was the individuals for who the payments were
earmarked, and not the charity, that were primarily benefited.

IV.

CONCLUSION

The parents of Mormon missionaries should be entitled to a charitable contribution deduction to the extent their payments are within the
amount recommended by the church. The deduction should be allowed
according to either section 1.170A-1 (g) (as an expense that is incurred
incidentally to the rendition of services to a qualifying charity) or Internal Revenue Code section 170(c) (as payments to or for the use of the
church). However, the away from home limitation of section 1.170A1(g) severely limits the deduction under that section. Therefore, as a
practical matter, the parents must claim the deduction under section
170.
The payments qualify under section 170 because the funds primarily benefit the church without bestowing any benefit on the child or
the parents other than the pride and satisfaction that normally accompanies charitable service.

K.C. Jensen

